A third successive motion to vacate a death sentence does not entitle a death-row inmate to a stay of execution when the circuit court already found the claims procedurally barred or without merit. The Florida Supreme Court applied that rule on November 13, 2026, affirming the summary denial of Thomas M. Overton’s third successive motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, denying his habeas corpus petition, and denying a stay of execution in Overton v. State, No. SC2026-1724, consolidated with Overton v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, No. SC2026-1725. Overton’s execution, under a warrant signed by Governor DeSantis, remains set for November 19, 2026. Justice Tanenbaum wrote for the Court; Chief Justice Couriel and Justices Muñiz, Grosshans, Francis, and Barrios joined; Justice Labarga concurred in the result only.
The 1991 murders. Overton was sentenced to death for the 1991 murders of Susan and Michael MacIvor in Monroe County. Susan, eight months pregnant, and Michael were strangled in their home; the medical examiner determined their baby boy lived for roughly thirty minutes after Susan died. A DNA match from evidence on the bedding, developed in 1996 after Overton was arrested on an unrelated burglary charge and confirmed by a second lab in 1998, tied him to the crime scene. A jury recommended death on both counts, the trial court imposed death sentences, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences on direct appeal in 2001; the judgment became final in 2002 when the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.
A warrant, a third successive motion, and a request for a stay of execution. Overton has unsuccessfully pursued collateral relief in state and federal courts for more than two decades. After Governor DeSantis signed the current death warrant, Overton sought public records from several state agencies, filed his third successive rule 3.851 motion, and separately petitioned the Supreme Court for habeas relief and a stay. The circuit court summarily denied the successive motion after a hearing on whether an evidentiary hearing was warranted.
No actual innocence claim without new evidence. Overton’s central claim was that he is actually innocent. The Court reiterated that Florida law allows no actual innocence claim “independent of newly discovered evidence,” and that Florida’s refusal to recognize one “does not violate the Eighth Amendment.” Even construed as a newly-discovered-evidence claim, it failed: Overton pointed to no new evidence, instead having “repackaged old attacks on the strength of the State’s evidence at trial,” and the claim was untimely under rule 3.851’s one-year deadline.
Public-records denials and the clemency due process claim. The circuit court had also sustained objections to Overton’s rule 3.852 demands to the Governor’s office, the Florida Commission on Offender Review, and the Department of Legal Affairs. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion, describing such demands as barred when they amount to a “fishing expedition” or are “overbroad or unduly burdensome.” Overton’s recycled due-process challenge to the clemency and warrant process fared no better; the Court called it “legally non-cognizable” and said it has “rejected this claim numerous times.” It separately rejected Overton’s argument that the Governor’s clemency policy is a bill of attainder, noting the Governor “cannot pass a bill of attainder; only the Legislature can enact laws.”
The habeas petition. Overton’s separate habeas petition argued that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is no longer constitutional for lack of safeguards. The Court called the argument one “raised with concerning frequency” and found, as it has before, that Florida’s death penalty statutes “establish the constitutionally required safeguards” against “arbitrary, capricious, or freakish” death sentences, leaving “no merit to Overton’s request for habeas relief.”
What this does and does not mean. The ruling does not reach whether the execution protocol itself violates due process; Overton forfeited that argument by omitting it from his initial brief. The Court did not revisit the trial evidence or disturb its 2001 decision affirming the convictions. It stated that “no motion for rehearing will be entertained by this Court” and that “the mandate shall issue immediately,” and Overton’s execution stays scheduled for November 19, 2026.
Overton separately filed a stay application with the United States Supreme Court on November 14, 2026; as of November 15, 2026, no ruling had been entered on that docket.
Related decisions: Can Prosecutors Appeal a Juvenile Disposition When the Judge Departs From the Plea Deal? Not Unless It Is Illegal, Says the First DCA Does Indirect Criminal Contempt Need a Sworn Affidavit? A Florida Appeals Court Reversed a Four-Day Jail Sentence for Missed Timesharing
Read the opinion (PDF): Download the opinion (PDF)
Source: Overton v. State, No. SC2026-1724, and Overton v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, No. SC2026-1725 (Fla. Nov. 13, 2026). This article is general information, not legal advice.
Also on Florida Lawyer News: Does Florida Recognize a Freestanding Actual Innocence Claim in Postconviction Capital Cases? No, the Supreme Court Holds, Denying Overton’s Stay
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