Every statutory change described below was verified word-for-word against the official text of the 2026 Florida Statutes, and every effective date was verified against the Legislature’s Chapter Number/Effective Date Report for the 2026 Regular Session. Dates below are the effective date of the act; where an act says “except as otherwise expressly provided,” an individual section within it may differ. Nothing here applies retroactively to conduct predating the change — which date governs a given case depends on the date of the offense.
The 2026 session produced a substantial set of changes to Florida criminal law. Press coverage has generally described them as taking effect October 1, 2026. That is only partly right, and the distinction matters. A number of the most consequential provisions — mandatory life for the manslaughter of an officer, the felony battery upgrade, the new prison releasee reoffender predicate, mandatory remand at conviction, and the sex doll possession felony — have already been in force since June 16 or July 1, 2026. Others genuinely do begin on October 1.
Because none of it reaches conduct occurring before its effective date, the operative question in any given case is which date applies. The table below gives the verified date for each.
At a glance
| Statute | What changed | Effective | Ch. / Bill |
|---|---|---|---|
| § 782.065 | Manslaughter of an officer added — mandatory life without release | June 16, 2026 | 2026-144 / SB 156 |
| §§ 843.01, 784.07, 776.051 | “Lawful execution of a legal duty” replaced with performance of official duties | June 16, 2026 | 2026-144 / SB 156 |
| § 790.115 | Discharge within 1,000 feet of a school — second-degree felony | May 15, 2026 | 2026-80 / HB 757 |
| § 784.03 | Prior resisting with violence upgrades a later battery to a felony | July 1, 2026 | 2026-149 / SB 436 |
| § 775.082(9) | New PRR predicate — battery on an officer causing bodily injury | July 1, 2026 | 2026-149 / SB 436 |
| § 847.011(5) | Sex doll possession raised from misdemeanor to third-degree felony | July 1, 2026 | 2026-20 / HB 1159 |
| § 903.04721 | Mandatory remand to custody at plea or verdict on a dangerous crime | July 1, 2026 | 2026-19 / HB 445 |
| § 775.08255 | New enhancement — foreign agents; reclassification + 15-year minimum | July 1, 2026 | 2026-66 / HB 905 |
| § 948.01(9) | New — postadjudicatory veterans treatment court | July 1, 2026 | 2026-128 / HB 199 |
| §§ 948.30, 856.022, 775.215, 947.1405 | Sex offender supervision — pool conditions; buffer 300 → 500 feet | July 1, 2026 | 2026-17 / SB 212 |
| § 775.15 | Limitations for failure to report child abuse runs from agency awareness | July 1, 2026 | 2026-95 / SB 590 |
| §§ 827.071, 847.0137 | “Child pornography” renamed “child sexual abuse material”; new § 847.0015 | July 1, 2026 | 2026-18 / HB 245 |
| §§ 775.30–775.34, 943.03102 | New domestic terrorist organization category | July 1, 2026 | 2026-28 / HB 1471 |
| §§ 933.02, 933.07, 934.025, 934.50 | Search warrants — remote appearance, deceased body, drones | July 1, 2026 | 2026-177 / HB 359 |
| § 893.135 | New crime: trafficking in xylazine — 3, 7, and 25-year minimums | Oct. 1, 2026 | 2026-148 / SB 432 |
| § 569.216 | New section: nitrous oxide prohibition aimed at licensed dealers | Oct. 1, 2026 | 2026-148 / SB 432 |
| § 903.0472 | New crime: willfully violating pretrial release conditions | Oct. 1, 2026 | 2026-155 / HB 397 |
| § 800.035 | New offense: indecent exposure while observing a child | Oct. 1, 2026 | 2026-159 / HB 1525 |
| § 817.537 | New offense: fraudulent entry of a residential dwelling unit | Oct. 1, 2026 | 2026-143 / HB 1293 |
| § 874.03 | Gang membership criteria extended to social media | Oct. 1, 2026 | 2026-156 / HB 429 |
| § 775.261 | Career Offender Registration expanded | Oct. 1, 2026 | 2026-151 / SB 1332 |
The new minimum mandatory: trafficking in xylazine — § 893.135
This is the most consequential addition for sentencing exposure. Xylazine — the veterinary sedative sold on the street as “tranq” — was added to the controlled substance schedules, and a new trafficking tier was built around it at § 893.135(1)(c)7.
The conduct reached is the usual trafficking verbs: knowingly selling, purchasing, manufacturing, delivering, or bringing into the state — or being in actual or constructive possession of — 28 grams or more of xylazine, any salt of it, or any mixture containing it. The offense is a first-degree felony called “trafficking in xylazine.”
| Quantity | Mandatory minimum | Fine |
|---|---|---|
| 28 grams or more, less than 100 grams | 3 years | $50,000 |
| 100 grams or more, less than 200 grams | 7 years | $100,000 |
| 200 grams or more | 25 years | $500,000 |
Note the structure, because it is the same trap that has always made drug trafficking different from other drug offenses: possession alone triggers it, the quantity thresholds are measured by the weight of any mixture containing the substance rather than the pure drug, and the mandatory minimum attaches on the weight without regard to role. Xylazine is frequently encountered mixed into other substances, which makes the mixture rule especially significant here.
Chapter 2026-148 (CS/SB 432) takes effect October 1, 2026, “except as otherwise provided” — the act itself carries earlier dates for some sections, including the scheduling of xylazine as a controlled substance. The § 893.135 trafficking tiers are October 1. For the existing trafficking structure see Drug Trafficking Minimum Mandatory Sentences.
Mandatory life: manslaughter of an officer — § 782.065
Section 782.065 already required life imprisonment without eligibility for release where the victim was a law enforcement, correctional, or correctional probation officer and the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder without a death sentence, second- or third-degree murder, attempted murder, or attempted felony murder.
Manslaughter under § 782.07(1) has now been added to that list. The consequence is blunt: a manslaughter conviction where the victim is a covered officer carries a mandatory sentence of life without eligibility for release, notwithstanding § 775.082, § 775.0823, § 782.04, § 782.051, and chapter 921. The Criminal Punishment Code scoresheet becomes irrelevant.
The findings must be made by the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt — both that the offense occurred and that the victim was a covered officer. The covered classes include part-time and auxiliary officers in each category, as those terms are defined in § 943.10.
The same amendment changed the predicate describing what the officer was doing. The former requirement that the officer be engaged in the “lawful” execution of a legal duty is gone, replaced by “engaged in the performance of his or her official duties as described in s. 943.10.”
Effective date. This provision came from ch. 2026-144 (CS/SB 156), which took effect on becoming law, June 16, 2026. It has therefore been in force since mid-June — it is not an October 1 change.
The word “lawful” comes out — § 843.01 and § 784.07
The same substitution was made in the resisting-with-violence statute. Section 843.01 previously reached resistance to an officer “in the lawful execution of any legal duty.” It now reads “in the execution of legal process or engaged in the performance of his or her official duties as described in s. 943.10.” Section 784.07, covering assault and battery on officers and other specified personnel, was amended along the same lines.
This is a narrow textual change with a wide practical effect. The lawfulness of what the officer was doing had been the textual hook for arguing that resistance to an unlawful exercise of authority did not violate the statute. That hook is now gone from the text.
Prior record turns a misdemeanor into a felony — § 784.03
Battery is ordinarily a first-degree misdemeanor. Under § 784.03(2), a person with one prior conviction from a listed set who commits any second or subsequent battery commits a third-degree felony — up to five years in state prison.
That list has been expanded. It now reads: battery, aggravated battery, felony battery, or resisting an officer with violence under § 843.01.
Two features matter. “Conviction” is defined for this subsection to mean a determination of guilt by plea or trial regardless of whether adjudication was withheld or a nolo plea was entered — so a withhold still counts. And the new predicate means a single old resisting-with-violence case, which is itself a third-degree felony, now converts an ordinary misdemeanor battery into a felony.
A new prison releasee reoffender predicate — § 775.082(9)
The PRR enumerated list gained a new entry at sub-subparagraph s.: “Battery on a law enforcement officer which results in bodily injury.” The internal cross-references moved from “1.a.–r.” to “1.a.–s.” accordingly.
The significance is the PRR consequence itself: where the State establishes the status, the sentence is the statutory maximum, served at 100%, with no parole, gain time, or early release. For a third-degree felony that is five years day-for-day. See Florida Minimum Mandatory Sentences.
Gang membership moves online — § 874.03
A “criminal gang member” is a person who meets two or more of the statutory criteria. A “criminal gang associate” needs only one. The criteria list was amended in three places:
- (a) Admission now counts whether made in person or on an online platform or social media
- (b) New criterion — being identified or claimed by a criminal gang as one of its members
- (m) New criterion — using gang-related language in furtherance of criminal gang-related activity on an online platform or social media
Criterion (b) is worth dwelling on, because it does not depend on anything the defendant did. Being claimed by others is now a qualifying criterion, and only two are needed. The statute also provides that where a single act or factual transaction satisfies more than one criterion, each of those criteria is thereby satisfied — so one social media post could conceivably supply more than one.
The enhancement mechanism in § 874.04, which reclassifies the degree of an offense committed for the benefit of a criminal gang, was not substantively changed. The expansion is entirely on the definitional side — which is where the fight over these enhancements is usually won or lost.
Career offender registration — § 775.261
The Florida Career Offender Registration Act is not new, but it is often overlooked and it was expanded this session. It applies to any person designated as a habitual violent felony offender, violent career criminal, or three-time violent felony offender under § 775.084, or as a prison releasee reoffender under § 775.082(9).
| Initial registration | In person at the sheriff’s office within 48 hours of establishing a permanent, temporary, or transient residence, or of entering the county — which includes being discharged from a correctional facility or jail in that county |
| Reregistration | In person each year during the month of the offender’s birthday |
| Leaving Florida | Report in person at least 48 hours before establishing residence in another state or jurisdiction |
| Failure to comply | Second-degree felony — up to 15 years |
The 2026 amendments refined the definitions the obligation runs on — adding a detailed definition of “permanent residence” (three or more consecutive days at the person’s home or primary living place, counting any part of a calendar day and excluding the first day), and adding “professional license” to the reportable information.
The practical point for anyone who has ever been sentenced as a PRR, HVFO, VCC, or three-time violent felony offender: a registration obligation with a 48-hour clock and a second-degree felony penalty attaches to the designation itself, independent of the sentence already served.
Nitrous oxide — § 569.216
This new section is narrower than much of the coverage suggests. It makes it unlawful for a dealer licensed or permitted under chapter 569, or a dealer’s agent or employee, to possess, sell, possess with intent to sell, deliver, or give nitrous oxide on or from the licensed premises. The offense is a third-degree felony.
- It does not apply to a grocery store or supermarket licensed by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services — but it does apply to a convenience business as defined in § 812.171
- It does not prohibit a finished food product in which nitrous oxide is used solely as a propellant
- DBPR is directed to adopt implementing rules
Separately, § 877.111 — the general harmful-chemical-substance inhalation statute — was not amended and continues to govern individual possession and inhalation offenses.
Obscene child-like sex dolls — possession becomes a felony — § 847.011(5)
Florida has prohibited obscene child-like sex dolls since 2019. What changed in 2026 is the penalty for simple possession, and the change is a full two steps.
The former version split the conduct into two paragraphs. Paragraph (5)(a) covered the distribution-type conduct — selling, lending, giving away, distributing, transmitting, showing, transmuting, offering to do any of those, possessing with intent to do any of those, or advertising — as a third-degree felony. A separate paragraph (5)(b) covered bare possession, and made it only a first-degree misdemeanor on a first offense.
The 2026 amendment folded bare possession into the same paragraph as the distribution conduct and deleted the misdemeanor tier. The operative language now prohibits, in a single list, selling, lending, giving away, distributing, transmitting, showing or transmuting; offering to do so; having in his or her possession, custody, or control; possessing with intent to do any of those; or advertising in any manner an obscene, child-like sex doll.
| Conduct | Before | Now |
|---|---|---|
| Possession alone, first offense | First-degree misdemeanor | Third-degree felony — up to 5 years |
| Possession alone, second or subsequent | Third-degree felony | Second-degree felony — up to 15 years |
| Selling, distributing, advertising, possession with intent | Third-degree felony | Third-degree felony — unchanged |
| Same, second or subsequent | Second-degree felony | Second-degree felony — unchanged |
So the distribution penalties did not move. The entire effect of the amendment falls on the person who possesses one and does nothing else — conduct that was a misdemeanor and is now a felony carrying a potential prison sentence, and with it the collateral consequences that attach to any felony conviction.
A renaming that affects old paperwork — § 827.071 and § 847.0137
Both statutes were amended to replace “child pornography” with “child sexual abuse material.” Section 827.071 is now titled “Sexual performance by a child; child sexual abuse material; penalties,” and § 847.0137 is “Transmission of child sexual abuse material by electronic device or equipment prohibited.”
The Legislature also created an entirely new section, § 847.0015, to say expressly what the rename does and does not do. It states the intent to change the term throughout the Florida Statutes because “child sexual abuse material” better represents the nature of the content and emphasizes that the child is a victim — and that the change is not intended to alter the definition of the term or the elements of any offense.
Most usefully for anyone briefing one of these cases, § 847.0015(2) provides that any prior judicial interpretation or finding from state or federal case law relating to child pornography must be applied in the same manner to any offense relating to child sexual abuse material. The section reaches every law using the new term, including chapters 39, 92, 435, 456, 775, 827, 836, 903, 948, and 960. In short: the older case law is not disturbed, and citing it remains correct.
The conduct and penalties are unchanged. The practical effect is on citation and drafting: charging documents, plea colloquies, scoresheets, and every reported decision before 2026 use the old terminology. See Florida Sex Offenses.
Beyond the headline bills
The five bills that drew press coverage are not the whole of it. A section-by-section sweep of the criminal titles — Title XLVI (Crimes), Title XLVII (Criminal Procedure and Corrections), and the motor vehicle chapters — turns up roughly 175 statutes carrying a 2026 chapter law in their history. Most are conforming edits, chiefly the “child sexual abuse material” renaming rippling through cross-references. These are the ones with practical bite.
Two new bond statutes — § 903.0472 and § 903.04721
Both are new sections, and together they are probably the most consequential change of the session for anyone out on bond.
§ 903.0472 makes willfully violating a condition of pretrial release a first-degree misdemeanor — a third-degree felony on a second or subsequent violation — where the underlying arrest was for one of fifteen listed offenses, a list that ends with the catch-all “any other felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence.” It also requires that the person be held in custody until first appearance, and adds warrantless-arrest authority at § 901.15(17).
§ 903.04721 requires the court to remand the defendant to custody immediately, with no bond pending sentencing, on a plea or finding of guilt — regardless of adjudication — to any dangerous crime under § 907.041(5)(a), and it applies whether or not an appeal is intended or filed.
Both are covered in detail on Pretrial detention.
A sentencing alternative, not a penalty — § 948.01(9)
Nearly everything else this session ran one direction. This provision runs the other. For offenses committed on or after July 1, 2026, and notwithstanding § 921.0024, a sentencing court may place a defendant into a postadjudicatory veterans treatment court program where:
- the offense is a nonviolent felony — defined here as a third-degree felony under chapter 810, or any felony that is not a forcible felony under § 776.08;
- the defendant is a servicemember or veteran as defined in § 394.47891(2); and
- the defendant is otherwise qualified under § 394.47891(8).
Satisfactory completion must be made a condition of probation or community control, the defendant must be fully advised and must agree to enter, and the sentencing court relinquishes jurisdiction to the veterans treatment court until the defendant leaves the program, is terminated for noncompliance, or completes the sentence. Because it operates notwithstanding the Criminal Punishment Code scoresheet, it is a genuine alternative to a scored prison sentence for a qualifying veteran.
Resisting, arrest, and the use of force — § 776.051
The statute governing when force may be used against an officer was conformed to the same change made in § 843.01 and § 782.065. Where it formerly spoke of an officer “making an arrest or in the execution of a legal duty,” it now reaches an arrest or detention and the officer’s performance of duties. Read alongside the deletion of “lawful” elsewhere, the 2026 session narrowed the space for a defense premised on the officer having acted unlawfully.
Proximity to children — § 856.022 and § 775.215
Section 856.022 — loitering or prowling by certain offenders near children — was retitled to add a prohibition on contact or communication with children in certain locations, and its buffer distance was increased from 300 to 500 feet.
New subsection (4)(a) makes it unlawful for a covered person to knowingly contact, communicate with, or approach with intent to contact a person younger than 18 in any park building, or on real property comprising any park, playground, or public swimming pool — with an exception for the person’s own family or household member as defined in § 741.28. Subsection (4)(b) adds notification and supervision requirements for being present at a school or child care facility. A companion amendment to § 901.15 added warrantless arrest authority for a (4)(a) violation.
Section 775.215, the residency restriction, gained a detailed definition of “public swimming pool” and a July 1, 2026 demarcation in its applicability. These pair with the new sex offender probation conditions at § 948.30(6) and (7) — see Florida Sex Offenses.
Offenses created from scratch
Four new criminal sections were added that had no predecessor:
| § 775.08255 Offenses by foreign agents | Not a new crime but a new enhancement, and the only one added this session. Any misdemeanor or felony committed for the purpose of benefiting, promoting, or furthering a foreign government, a designated foreign terrorist organization, or an agent of either is reclassified one full degree upward — a first-degree felony becomes a life felony. A conviction of a first-degree or life felony under it carries a 15-year minimum mandatory. Detail on Florida Minimum Mandatory Sentences |
| § 800.035 Indecent exposure while observing a child | Third-degree felony. Requires observing a child under 16 for the offender’s own sexual arousal, plus lewd exposure or a sexual act not involving contact. It is not a defense that the child was unaware or did not see the offender. Exceptions for breastfeeding and for nudity in a place set apart for it |
| § 817.537 Fraudulent entry of a residential dwelling unit | Third-degree felony to take possession of a rental by a materially false written statement of identity on the application, forged or counterfeit documents (driver license, ID, bank statement, paystub), or impersonating the person named on the application |
| § 934.51 Signal jamming devices | First-degree misdemeanor to possess, manufacture, offer for sale, sell, import, distribute, or use one. Exceptions for federal or military law enforcement in a criminal investigation and for FCC-authorized persons |
A new category: domestic terrorist organizations
Sections 775.30, 775.32, 775.33, and 775.34 were each amended to add “domestic terrorist organization,” defined as an organization whose designation has been published in the Florida Administrative Register under the new § 943.03102. That section empowers the Chief of Domestic Security to designate an organization as a domestic terrorist organization on findings that it is based or operates here or in the United States, is engaging in terrorist activity as defined in § 775.30, and that the activity is an ongoing threat.
The practical consequence is that membership-and-support offenses in §§ 775.33 and 775.34 now reach organizations designated by a state executive officer through an administrative publication, rather than only federally designated foreign organizations.
Firearms near schools — § 790.115
Subsection (2)(d) was restructured. It previously made it a second-degree felony to discharge a weapon or firearm while in violation of the on-campus possession ban. It now reaches that conduct and, at new subparagraph (2)(d)2., discharging any weapon or firearm within 1,000 feet of a school, during school hours or during a sanctioned school activity — also a second-degree felony.
Two limits are written into the new subparagraph. It does not apply where the weapon is discharged in lawful defense of oneself or another, or for a lawful purpose. And it expressly does not apply to discharge on private real property within 1,000 feet of a school by the owner, or by a person whose presence there was authorized, licensed, or invited by the owner.
Warrants, remote appearance, and drones
- § 933.07(5) and the new § 934.025 both authorize a judge to let an officer applying for a search warrant appear remotely using audio-video communication technology
- § 933.02(6) adds a new ground for a warrant — to recover a deceased body
- § 934.50 was amended to make explicit that a warrant may authorize drone use, including a search warrant authorizing an agency to search areas where evidence might reasonably be found, and creates a Drone as First Responder Grant Program
Juvenile — chapters 984 and 985
Roughly a dozen sections across chapters 984 and 985 carry a 2026 chapter law, but on examination none of them changes a penalty or creates an offense. The amendments are conforming and administrative:
- § 984.03 — definitions amended to read “parent, legal guardian,” where they previously said only “parent,” a change carried through the chapter
- § 984.09 — contempt reach adjusted from a child “adjudicated as a child in need of services” to one “subject to proceedings under this chapter”
- § 985.6865 — quarterly review of county juvenile detention payments, with the department directed to have the Department of Revenue withhold from a county that has not met its obligations — a cost-allocation provision between the state and counties, not a change to juvenile delinquency law
- The remainder are punctuation and cross-reference conforming edits
Said plainly: if you practice in juvenile delinquency, the 2026 session did not move the substantive law. The CINS/FINS chapter picked up legal guardians alongside parents, and the counties picked up a collection mechanism.
Shorter notes
| § 775.15(23) | For a violation of § 39.201 — failure to report child abuse — the limitations period does not begin to run until a law enforcement or other governmental agency, excluding the institution where the violation occurred, is made aware of it |
| § 933.02(6) | New ground for issuing a search warrant: to recover a deceased body. Section 933.05, governing issuance and return, was also rewritten |
| § 921.0022 | The offense severity ranking chart was amended by several different 2026 acts. Anyone scoring a case should work from the current chart rather than a saved copy |
| §§ 943.0585, 943.059 | Expunction and sealing — a new disclosure category was added for persons screened through the Care Provider Background Screening Clearinghouse under § 435.12 |
| § 836.13 | Altered sexual depictions — conformed to the “child sexual abuse material” terminology |
| § 943.0536 | New section on immigration detainer information, including administrative expunction of detainer records made contrary to law or by mistake |
| § 893.138 | Public nuisance — a place used on more than two occasions in 12 months as the site of a § 849.01 gambling house violation is added |
| § 316.193 | Amended by ch. 2026-14 (SB 104), a reviser’s bill effective May 12, 2026. Reviser’s bills make technical and conforming corrections rather than substantive change — no DUI penalty change |
The through-line
Several of these changes share a structure worth naming. They do not create new conduct offenses so much as attach new consequences to prior record and to status — a prior resisting case that converts a misdemeanor to a felony, a prior enhancement designation that creates a freestanding registration crime, a new PRR predicate, and a definitional expansion that makes a gang designation easier to establish. Litigation over these provisions will mostly be litigation about predicates and definitions, not about the underlying act.
Where a claim turns on one of these provisions, how and when it is raised will usually decide whether it is reviewable at all. See Issues to preserve.